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Tyranny of the red lines

Equally important, Moscow's tactical victory in Georgia has left it isolated. The Russian government looked round the world for applause and support and found none. Other countries expect steadiness and prudence from a great power and, when these are lacking, tend to conclude that it is neither truly great nor truly powerful


Story from The Guardian
Published: September 5, 2008


Does power still come out of the barrel of a gun, or, for that matter, out of the nozzle of a petrol pump, in the 21st century? That is the question raised by Russia's actions in Georgia and elsewhere in Europe in recent months. The short answer is yes, but the long answer is likely to be no. The end of Russia's era of energy affluence is already in sight, and the limitations of its still ramshackle military forces are obvious. The leverage given to it by oil, gas, and such military strength as it possesses must inevitably diminish over the coming years.

Equally important, Moscow's tactical victory in Georgia has left it isolated. The Russian government looked round the world for applause and support and found none. Other countries expect steadiness and prudence from a great power and, when these are lacking, tend to conclude that it is neither truly great nor truly powerful.

Russia's earlier use of energy cuts to signal displeasure to European states whose policies it dislikes, as well as its forced takeovers of foreign enterprises, had already contributed to the picture of an increasingly unreliable and capricious regime. The settlement yesterday of the dispute over TNK-BP, the joint venture which is Russia's third largest oil company, will not much change this image. True the deal could have been more damaging to BP than it actually is, but the affair has still been resolved almost entirely on Russia's terms.

It is evident that the United States and Europe have acted less than wisely in dealing with Russia. The project of Nato expansion up to Russia's borders, even though driven in part by the anxieties which new and prospective members entertained about Russia's intentions, might have been conducted with more sensitivity. There are genuine questions about the best way to manage the intricate nationalisms and sub-nationalisms of the Caucasus, on the one hand, and about the proper status in a sensible security system of Ukraine, a country of divided allegiance, on the other, which were pushed aside in the march to a bigger Nato.

Vice-President Dick Cheney, yesterday dispensing rhetoric in both Georgia and Ukraine, was one of the champions of that expansion, and of the United States' plans to install missile batteries in Poland and the Czech republic. These were and are an unnecessary provocation, even though they represent no military threat whatever to Russia. The Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, may pretend otherwise during his current visit to Poland, though he knows he will not be taken seriously. But, whatever the balance of responsibility may have been, from Warsaw to Kiev to Tbilisi, red line was set against red line, and the result is that both sides are now in a quandary. The west does not see itself pulling back those Nato markers, while Russia will not let Nato expansion continue without retaliating in some dangerous and almost certainly counterproductive way.

The beginning of wisdom for both sides might be to demilitarise the situation in Georgia, trading a limited, rather than a pointedly lavish, restoration of Georgian forces for a full Russian withdrawal into the enclaves, a large European monitoring presence, and a reduction of Russian troop strength in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The end of it might be an agreement to recognise that, whatever happens over Nato membership for Georgia, some way that is acceptable to both sides must be found of recognising Ukraine's special character and status.

But, in an election year concessions are difficult for America, while the Russians are still so full of themselves and their little victory that they have yet to come down to earth. There needs to be a period of reflection on both sides, particularly on the Russian one. Until Russians see that they are as much in danger of making "a historic mistake," in Mr Lavrov's words, as is the west, we will not see much progress.


(Published: 10.09.2008.)